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HOW TO BE A THIRD PILLAR GUARDIAN OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS? 
THE IRISH SUPREME COURT AND THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT 
DR. ELAINE FAHEY  
 
 
Summary 
 
The author outlines recent developments as to the operation of the European arrest 
warrant before the Irish Supreme Court.  The European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003 
includes a far-reaching obligation to refuse surrender where a breach of fundamental 
rights has occurred, one that has been read down dramatically by the Irish courts. While 
the Irish courts cannot access the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 35 EU, they have 
employed the Pupino decision so as to “bridge the gap” and provide judicial protection. 
The effectiveness of the Supreme Court as a Third Pillar guardian of fundamental rights 
is thus considered.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the recent decision of Advocaten voor de Wereld,1 the Court of Justice has upheld the 
validity of the European arrest warrant and has given its imprimatur to the new surrender 
procedures replacing traditional extradition systems and key principles of national 
constitutional law and extradition law, such as dual criminality. This decision comes at an 
important time as the use of the surrender procedure rises exponentially in the Member 
States, nearly three years into its operation.2 The European arrest warrant has been 
considered on a number of occasions by the Irish Supreme Court recently in several 
unsuccessful challenges on fundamental rights and procedural grounds and the number of 
individuals surrendered to other States by the Irish courts during this time has also 
increased dramatically.3 However, the Irish courts have been denied access to the Court 
                                                  Assistant Lecturer in Law, School of Social Sciences and Law, DIT, Ireland.  
1 C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad, [2007] ECR I-3633. 
2 Adopted pursuant to Title VI of the Treaty on European Union Council Framework Decision of 13 June 
2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States OJ L 190 p. 1. 
See the Report from the Commission based on Article 34 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 
2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between member states (COM)2006 8 
final and Commission Staff Working Document Annex to the Report from the Commission on the 
implementation since 2005 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States SEC(2007) 979. 
3 The law is stated here as of 12 May, 2008. Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. Dundon 
[2005] IESC 13; [2005] 1 IR 261; Dundon v. Governor of Clover Hill Prison [2005] IESC 83; [2006] 1 IR 
518; Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. Altaravicius [2006] IESC 23; [2006] 3 IR 148; 
Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. Stapleton [2007] IESC 30; [2006] 3 IR 26; Minister for 
Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. Rodnov  (Supreme Court, Unreported, ex tempore, 1st June, 2006); 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v. Brennan [2007] IESC 21; Ó Fallúin v. Governor of 
Cloverhill [2007] IESC 20; Minister for Justice v. S.R. [2007] IESC 54; Minister for Justice, Equality & 
Law Reform v. Gardener  [2007] IESC 40; Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. Tobin [2008] 
IESC 3; Butenas v. Governor of Cloverhill Prison [2008] IESC 9; Minister for Justice, Equality & Law 
Reform v. Johnston [2008] IESC 11; Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. Puta & Sulej [2008] 
IESC 29; [2008] IESC 30. See generally www.courts.ie.  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1788282
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of Justice through the guise of the preliminary ruling mechanism by virtue of the decision 
of the Irish State not to accept the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in respect of Third 
Pillar matters pursuant to Article 35 EU.4 
 
Seeds of a major supremacy dispute relating to fundamental rights have of course 
famously been sown in the past in respect of Ireland and the Court of Justice as to the 
abortion controversy.5 It does not appear that any such saga however will result from the 
European arrest warrant in Irish law. In a major constitutional development, the Court of 
Justice in its landmark decision in Pupino6 has recently transferred its longstanding First 
pillar caselaw on the obligations of Members State courts to interpret national law in light 
of European Union law, to the Third Pillar, thereby extending its own jurisdiction beyond 
that contemplated by the Treaties.7 This decision has proven itself to be of major 
importance in the Irish context, it would seem, where the national courts have been 
content in more caselaw to use Pupino to ―bridge the gap‖ in the absence of a means to 
refer questions to the Court of Justice.8  But the issue remains:  what should a national 
Supreme Court do to protect fundamental rights when it is unable itself to refer questions 
to the Court of Justice? Does an uncritical application of Pupino solve this difficulty? 
And what measures can legitimately be inserted in domestic implementation laws to 
―bridge the gap‖ further, for example to protect fundamental rights in the realm of the 
Third Pillar under national constitutional law?9 The Irish jurisprudence on extradition 
had traditionally been particularly favourable to the accused and had an illustrious history 
of being acutely conscious of potential human rights violations.10 This jurisprudence, 
however, has been disavowed with the enactment of the arrest warrant procedure. 
 
                                                 
4 See OJ 2005 L 327 p. 19. While the level of acceptance of this jurisdiction has proven to be rather uneven 
across the Member States, Ireland, the United Kingdom and Denmark remain isolated in this regard, in 
their decision to entirely exclude access from their courts to the Luxembourg Court.  
5 See Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution and the decision of the Court of Justice in C-159/90 SPUC v. 
Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685, the dispute most famously captured by Phelan ―The Right to life of the 
Unborn v. The Promotion of Trade in Services: The European Court of Justice and the Normative Shaping 
of the European Union‖ (1992) 55 Modern Law Review 670.   
6 C-105/03 Criminal Proceedings against Maria  Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285.  
7 The obligation most notably enunciated in Case 14/83 Von Colson & Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen  [1984] ECR I-1891 and Case C-106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR I-4135. In Pupino, there is in 
fact no specific reference to these cases. 
8 See above fn. 3.  
9 Recital 12 of the Framework Decision provides that nothing in the Decision can ―prevent a Member State 
from applying its constitutional rules relating to due process, freedom of association, freedom of the press 
and freedom of expression in other media‖, discussed here below in ―The European arrest warrant and Irish 
law‖.  
10 See the account in O‘ Higgins ―Pink Underwear, the European arrest warrant and the Law of 
Extradition‖ (2007) 12(3) Bar Review 91; Hogan & Whyte eds., Kelly: The Irish Constitution (4th ed., 
Lexis-Nexis, 2003) para. 7.4.264-7.4.340. See the infamous decision of the Supreme Court in Ellis v. 
O’Dea [1989] IR 530, encapsulating decades of jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, where Walsh J. stated 
that:  
―… there must be not only a correspondence of offences but also a correspondence of fair 
procedures. No procedure to which the extradited person could be exposed may be one which, if followed 
in this State, would be condemned as being unconstitutional.‖ 
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This article considers recent developments in the Irish Supreme Court, where the 
surrender procedures have been subject of much analysis recently and in particular where 
fundamental rights objections have been rejected despite a legal framework existing to 
accommodate such disputes. 
 
 
1. The European arrest warrant and Irish law 
 
It is important to note that Ireland had not been consulted initially about the content of the 
European arrest warrant11 and the removal of the need for ―dual criminality‖ as 
contained in the European arrest warrant had at the outset presented a major challenge to 
key aspects of Irish caselaw on extradition existing for many decades. The Framework 
Decision was implemented into Irish law by the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003 and 
was recently amended by Part 8 of the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act, 2005, 
that sought in large measure to cure errors in implementation in the original legislation.12  
 
Recital 12 of the preamble to the Framework Decision provides that the adoption of the 
arrest warrant procedure did not: 
 
―prevent a Member State from applying its constitutional rules relating to due 
process, freedom of association, freedom of the press and freedom of expression 
in other media.‖  
 
This permission in Recital 12 has indeed been taken up in Ireland as it has in other 
jurisdictions.13 In fact, the Irish Government in drafting the European Arrest Warrant 
Act, 2003,14 went particularly far to ensure that the surrender procedures could 
satisfactorily protect fundamental rights norms pursuant to Recital 12 of the Framework 
Decision.15 The end result was the adoption of s. 37 of the Act of 2003, which provides 
that: 
 
―[a] person shall not be surrendered under this Act if … (b) his or her surrender 
would constitute a contravention of any provision of the Constitution...‖ 
 
On either a literal or purposive construction, s. 37 does appear to exceed the text of the 
Framework Decision. The Commission has recently suggested that s. 37 goes further than 
                                                 
11 Irish Times, May 21st, 2002.  
12 See Report On the Operation of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 (as amended) in the year 2006 
made to the Houses of the Oireachtas by the Central Authority in the person of the Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform pursuant to s. 6(6) of the European Arrest Act 2003 (Department of Justice, 
Ireland, 2006).  
13 Commission Staff Working Document, fn. 2 above, p. 5.  
14 As amended by the (Criminal Justice Terrorist Offences) Act, 2005. 
15 The then Minister for Justice, introducing the European Arrest Warrant Bill, 2003 in the Dáil (Irish 
Parliament), adopted s. 37 after considerable pressure being brought to bear on him so as to protect 
fundamental rights in the new surrender regime: see Irish Human Rights Commission Observations on the 
European Arrest Warrant Bill (IHRC, September, 2003) (see www.ihrc.ie).  The Minister (577 Dáil 
Debates 10 (17 December, 2003) contended that ―no state in the European Union [would] have a higher 
degree of real and substantial protection for those who seek the protection of its courts‖. 
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any other comparable Member State implementation measure as well as going beyond the 
text of the Framework Decision and gives rise to an incorrect implementation thereof.16 
Whether s. 37 represents a mis-implementation of the Framework Decision remains an 
interesting unsolved question in so far as infringement proceedings cannot be brought 
against Ireland by the Commission in the realm of the Third Pillar17 and an individual 
the subject of surrender proceedings may not ask an Irish Court to refer such questions to 
the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 35 EU. Notwithstanding, ostensibly the Irish 
judiciary are under a far-reaching obligation to treat human rights concerns expressed in 
surrender applications in the most serious fashion.  However, the practical operation of 
the Act of 2003 has not matched the ideal and the role of s. 37 has been ―read down‖ 
dramatically through judicial interpretation, as will be outlined below.  
 
 
2. The Third Pillar, the European Arrest Warrant and Judicial Protection: Pupino 
to the Rescue in the Irish Courts? 
 
The Court of Justice has a particularly limited jurisprudence in Third Pillar matters to 
date. 18 The absence of preliminary references from Member State courts that are 
actually competent to refer matters to the Court in the realm of the Third Pillar is perhaps 
somewhat striking, given the multitude of practical problems as to the workings of 
surrender procedure that have arisen in the Irish courts at least. Unsurprisingly, then 
given this dearth of caselaw, a clarification by the Court of Justice of the role of national 
courts in controlling the legality of acts is particularly ripe in the realm of the Third 
Pillar.19  More recently, the Court of Justice itself has extended the principle of ―indirect 
effect‖, usually associated with the First Pillar to the Third Pillar in the landmark decision 
of Criminal Proceedings against Maria Pupino20. This new ―cross-pillarisation‖ of long-
standing EC law doctrines, of course, raises major constitutional questions, particularly as 
to what protections we can offer the accused in the area of criminal justice, where 
traditionally national sovereignty and concern for national constitutional protections over 
due process have prevailed. Despite it temporally recent origins, the Pupino decision has 
been followed extensively and with much approval in the Irish Supreme Court, in recent 
caselaw in this area. However, the manner in which Pupino has been applied in Ireland, 
largely uncritically, merits some attention, in so far as the courts have used the decision 
                                                 
16 See Commission Staff Working Document (see fn. 2), pp. 5-6. Italy is also criticised for similar reasons. 
17 Article 35 EU contains no provision akin to Article 226 EC, as part of the formal system of remedies 
contained in the Treaties. 
18 Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285; Case C-467/05 Dell’Orto [2007] ECR I-5557; C-303/05 
Advocaten voor de Wereld [2007] ECR I-3633. Contrast these cases with the successful annulment action, 
not a preliminary reference, recently taken by the Commission pursuant to Article 35(6) EU in Case C-
440/05 Commission v. Council, judgment of 23 October 2007, nyr, as to the Framework Decision 
strengthening the enforcement of ship-source pollution law. The Framework Decision was annulled by the 
Court on grounds of a lack of competence.  
19 See Peers ―Salvation Outside the Church: Judicial Protection in the Third Pillar After Pupino and Segi 
Judgments‖ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 883; Walker ed., Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice (Oxford University Press, 2004). 
20 Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285. See Prechal ―Direct Effect, Indirect Effect, Supremacy and 
the Evolving Constitution of the European Union‖ in Barnard ed., The Fundamentals of EU law Revisited 
(Oxford University Press, 2007).  
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to ―bridge the gap‖, using it to construe the Framework Decision that they are unable to 
seek further interpretive assistance with.21 Whether in fact the Irish courts have 
construed the national implementation legislation as to the arrest warrant contra legem as 
a result of their uncritical adherence to Pupino remains a difficult question, considered 
below.  
 
 
3. The European arrest warrant in the Irish Supreme Court: Leading Decisions 
 
The Supreme Court has dismissed a range of recent challenges in surrender proceedings. 
A number of practical difficulties have emerged in this area and been resolved in the 
absence of a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice to resolve the questions posed. 
The caselaw of the Irish Supreme Court is considered here under four headings: (1) 
fundamental fights objections to surrender proceedings,  (2) evidential aspects of the 
arrest warrant procedure, (3) time limits in arrest warrant proceedings and (4) access to 
justice in surrender proceedings  
 
1.  Fundamental rights objections in surrender proceedings 
 
The Supreme Court has rejected all challenges on fundamental rights grounds in 
surrender proceedings, despite the express inclusion of s. 37 into the implementation 
legislation. It would appear that the relevance and utility of s. 37 is now highly 
questionable, it having been ―read down‖ most significantly, despite the judicial lacuna 
remaining. In the first Supreme Court decision examining the operation of s. 37 in Irish 
law, in Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. Brennan,22 the appellant who had 
absconded from prison in the UK, sought to appeal to the Supreme Court against his 
surrender by order of the High Court. The appellant submitted that in light of having 
absconded from prison he now faced surrender for a common law offence, that of 
escaping from lawful custody, the maximum term being life imprisonment and resulting, 
he contended, in a disproportionate sentence in comparison to that applicable in Ireland23 
or alternatively that the proportionate nature of a sentence was a constitutionally 
                                                 
21 Another recent decision of the Court of Justice in the Third Pillar, relating to the same Framework 
Decision considered in Pupino is Case C-467/05 Dell’Orto, [2007] ECR I-5557. The Court of Justice held, 
on a strictly literal parsing of the text of the Decision, that an instrument that provided for damages for inter 
alia  the suffering of a natural person, entailed that legal persons could not avail of its provisions. 
Otherwise, the Court held, any other interpretation would contradict the very letter of the Framework 
Decision.  The text-based analysis rings quite differently to the broad ranging or teleological approach 
adopted by the Court of Justice in Pupino, to go beyond what the literal meaning of the Treaties would 
generally have been understood to entail. What is interesting also is the fact that national judge sought to 
rely on the Pupino decision to construe national law in Dell’Orto but that such a construction was ruled by 
the Court of Justice to be contra legem. 
22 Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v. Brennan [2007] IESC 21.  
23 The European arrest warrant in Brennan, under the heading ―Nature and Legal Classification of the 
Offences and the Applicable Statutory Provision/ Code‖ stated that: 
―Escaping from lawful custody is a common law offence and triable before a Judge and jury. It is 
punishable by a term of imprisonment and a fine. The term is not prescribed and is at the 
discretion of the Judge. As it is a common law offence, the maximum term of imprisonment that a 
Judge can impose is life.‖  
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protected right in Irish law, relying inter alia on s. 37. Murray C.J. for the Court24 held 
that while the surrender process was subject to constitutional scrutiny, the national courts 
remained subject to the Pupino interpretive obligation. Murray C.J. held that it could not 
have been the intention of the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament) in enacting s. 37 that the 
surrender of individuals would be refused if the manner in which a trial in the requested 
State would be carried out did not conform to the Constitution. He remarked that he was: 
 
―… not aware of any authority for the principle that the extradition or surrender of 
a person to a foreign country would contravene the Constitution simply because 
their legal system and system of trial differed from ours as envisaged by the 
Constitution.‖ 
 
However, Murray CJ was prepared to admit of some ―egregious circumstances such as a 
clearly established and fundamental defect in the system of justice‖ in the issuing State 
that would warrant a refusal of surrender pursuant to s. 37, that the Court was not 
prepared to speculate as to, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal. What is thus 
unmistakable as a result of the Supreme Court decision in Brennan is that the potential 
use to which s. 37 can be put is restricted to all but the most extreme or ―egregious‖ of 
situations, ostensibly contrary to the intention of parliament. Whether such an instance 
may in fact ever result remains another question.  
 
Similarly, in Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. Stapleton, 25 the Supreme 
Court there overturned a decision of the High Court that had refused the surrender of an 
individual to an English court on the basis of s. 37 of the Act of 2003. The arrest warrant 
in Stapleton had been issued in 2005 as to fraud offences allegedly committed between 
1978 and 1982 and he alleged that his right to a fair trial had been prejudiced by way of 
delay, warranting the prohibition of his surrender, which the High Court readily acceded 
to. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court per Fennelly J. was less prepared to 
entertain the complaint of delay, finding instead that the applicant had contributed in fact 
to the delay asserted as being unlawful.26  The Court reiterated its own decision in 
Brennan, that was interpreted by the Supreme Court as having set out per Fennelly J., 
―the correct approach‖ to the balancing of the constitutional rights of individuals subject 
to surrender procedures against the obligations of the State pursuant to the Framework 
Decision. Rather, he held mutual recognition and mutual confidence were key elements 
of the new system of surrender, citing with approval the decision of the Court of Justice 
in Advocaten voor de Wereld that had upheld the validity of the arrest warrant as 
compatible with fundamental rights.  However, nowhere in Stapleton is any reference 
made to the inability of the Irish Court of last instance to refer questions for a ruling to 
the Court of Justice. What is interesting about Stapleton is once again the overt 
willingness of the Court to downgrade the importance of s. 37 of the Act of 2003.27 
                                                 
24 Murray C.J., Macken & Finnegan JJ. Murray C.J. held that it had not been established nor could it be 
that the appellant would in fact be exposed to life imprisonment and the passages impugned by the 
appellant had been inserted there for informational purposes only. 
25 Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. Stapleton [2007] IESC 30; [2006] 3 IR 26.  
26 Murray C.J., Denham, Geoghegan, Fennelly & Kearns JJ.  
27 And to similar effect see the cases of Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. S.R. [2007] IESC 
54; Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. Gardener [2007] IESC 40, where similar delay 
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It seems clear, however, that the Supreme Court yet again is indicating its unconditional 
support for the new surrender procedures, an enthusiasm that remains unabated despite 
the existence of s.37. Clearly s. 37 cannot now be seen as having any potential to temper 
surrender requests falling short of Irish constitutional requirements, despite the efforts 
made to include such a device on the grounds of fairness. Notably, no reference is made 
to Dáil Debates (Parliamentary debates) as to the intention of Oireachtas (legislature) in 
adopting s. 37 of the Act of 2003.28 The Irish Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area 
demonstrates how the Recital 12 permission remains deeply problematic as a matter of 
national and European law. The Supreme Court jurisprudence surely gives rise to a 
question as to the utility of the Oireachtas inserting s. 37 into the Act of 2003 in the first 
place. If a modified or watered down obligation was intended, surely s. 37 would have 
been drafted so as to reflect as much. Instead, Pupino has been excessively fastened upon 
by the Irish courts, unable to consult the Court of Justice for clarification of the scope of 
the s. 37 obligation.  
 
2. Evidential aspects of the arrest warrant procedure 
 
The challenges to the arrest warrant arising in the Irish Supreme Court in the area of 
evidential aspects of the warrant are particularly important in so far as they bear upon 
both fundamental rights and procedural matters equally and may affect the uniformity of 
the operation of the arrest warrant in Europe generally. In the first major Supreme Court 
decision on the evidential aspects of the European arrest warrant, delivered temporally 
prior to Pupino, Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. Dundon,29 the appellant 
was the subject of an arrest warrant issued in respect of the offence of murder. The 
issuing judicial authority, an English Court, had received a written undertaking from the 
Parliamentary Under Secretary and the Director of Public Prosecutions as to the 
information contained in the warrant. The issue arose thus as to whether undertakings 
provided by the issuing State, pursuant to s 22 of the Act of 2003, were required to be 
given personally by the judge or court concerned and whether the courts in surrender 
proceedings had to consider the adequacy of evidence against an individual.30 The 
                                                                                                                                                 
challenges are rejected by the Supreme Court on appeal and where the Court invoked in the latter inter alia  
the ―scheme and spirit‖ of the Framework Decision to dismiss the cases. See Butenas v. Governor of 
Cloverhill Prison [2008] IESC 9, where a constitutional challenge to the validity of detention powers in s. 
16(4) of the Act of 2003 was rejected. In Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. Johnston [2008] 
IESC 11, an unsuccessful surrender challenge on the basis of inter alia delay, the plaintiff did not invoke s. 
37 at all. See also Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. Puta & Sulej [2008] IESC 29; [2008] 
IESC 30, an unsuccessful challenge to the technical adequacy of the constitutional ratification of the 
Framework Decision, where the first appellant also alleged that his surrender to the Czech Republic, which 
was averred to be ―more like the Wild West‖, would expose him to a justice system in breach of s. 37. The 
Supreme Court, per  Murray C.J., held that a heavy onus had to be discharged with cogent evidence to 
invoke s. 37 and that the ―irresponsible‖ allegations made could not prevail. 
28 The use and legitimacy of the use of such parliamentary debates remains subject to considerable dispute 
in Ireland. Ireland has yet to have a ―Pepper v. Hart” revolution ([1993] 1 All ER 42): see Crilly v. 
Farrington [2002] 1 ILRM 161.  
29 Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. Dundon [2005] IESC 13; [2005] 1 IR 261. 
30 S. 22 of the Act of 2003 provides that: 
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Supreme Court, per Denham J.,31 employing ordinary canons of statutory interpretation, 
held that there was no requirement that the undertaking ―given‖ had in fact to be made by 
the issuing authority and thus that the undertakings given complied fully with the Act. 
Moreover, the Court held that the adequacy of the evidence against the person sought was 
not a matter for consideration in surrender proceedings under the Act, thereby 
overturning the Court below. That there is no necessity to establish a prima facie case 
against an individual for them to be surrendered is a striking conclusion indeed, in the 
absence of clarification from the Court of Justice and the Supreme Court has thus 
disavowed decades of its own caselaw in the realm of extradition. Whilst probably 
correct, this conclusion flows directly from the consequences of full mutual recognition 
and not due process law and practice. 
 
To similar effect in Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform  v. Altaravicius32 a 
net point of law arose for consideration in the Supreme Court relating to the entitlement 
of a person subject to surrender to request the domestic warrant on foot of which an arrest 
warrant is issued. Thus, there the Supreme Court allowed an appeal against a High Court 
decision ordering a copy of the warrant for surrender from Lithuania to be produced 
before the Irish High Court, on the grounds of fair procedures and Recital 12 of the 
Framework Decision.33 The Supreme Court thus held that the European arrest warrant 
was based on mutual recognition and respect between judicial authorities and could not 
require an underlying warrant to be produced where neither the Act nor the Framework 
Decision explicitly so required. There was, as Denham J. described it, a ―presumption‖ 
that the underlying documents were in order, pursuant to s. 4A of the Act of 2003, 34 
which an individual could seek to rebut, thereby disentitling them to go on a general 
―fishing expedition‖. If this were not the case, Denham J. held, this would defeat the 
development that the European arrest warrant was, that of international co-operation 
predicated on mutual trust and judicial co-operation.35 Once again this outcome here 
flows logically from mutual recognition but the conclusion is reached in the absence of a 
consultation of the Court of Justice. Notably, the decision is delivered after Pupino but no 
reference is made thereto. Interestingly, Altaravicius is analogous to the recent decision 
of the House of Lords in Dabas v. High Court of Justice, Madrid36 discussed below, 
where a similar evidentiary request was dismissed.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
―(1) … a person shall not be surrendered under this Act unless… (b) an undertaking in writing is 
given to the High Court by the issuing judicial authority that the person will not be proceeded 
against, sentenced, or detained … for an offence committed before his or her surrender other than 
the offence … specified in the European arrest warrant concerned.‖ 
31 Upholding the High Court: Murray CJ, Denham, McGuinness, Hardiman & Geoghegan JJ.  
32 Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. Altaravicius [2006] IESC 23; [2006] 3 IR 148. The 
warrant in Altaravicius related to robbery offences allegedly committed in 2001 in Lithuania. 
33 Pursuant to s. 4A of the Act of 2003, as amended: ―It shall be presumed that an issuing state will comply 
with the requirements of the Framework Decision, unless the contrary is shown.‖ 
34 Murray CJ, Denham & Hardiman JJ.  
35 Denham J. further noted that a discretion was provided for in s. 20 of the Act of 2003, for a judge to 
seek further information from the issuing judicial authority, which had not yet been employed by the High 
Court in the instant case and that it had been open to the applicant here to have made such an application 
36 [2007] UKHL 6; [2007] 2 AC 31; [2007] 2 CMLR 39, see below, 4.1: ―Reading down s. 37 and using 
Pupino to ‗bridge the gap‘‖.  
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In Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. Rodnov37 the Supreme Court 
dismissed an appeal against a decision of the High Court, where the individual subject to 
surrender had complained that the arrest warrant was bad on its face in that it had omitted 
a formula of words at the commencement of the form that were contained in the annex to 
the Framework Decision.38 Murray C.J., for the Court, held that while there had been a 
want of strict formal compliance in the particular warrant at issue, the defect was not ―a 
want of formality which affected in any way the substance or effect of the European 
arrest warrant".39 Murray C.J. held that it would have been wholly unsatisfactory if the 
Court had to look for further information40 and rather a ―common sense approach‖ had 
to be adopted as to challenges to the evidentiary formalities of the warrant. There is no 
reference to Pupino here, perhaps understandably given that it is an ex tempore decision 
of the Court and thus marked by extreme brevity. Surely this question was one worthy of 
a definitive answer from the highest European Court but there is again no mention of the 
inability of the Supreme Court to consult the Court of Justice on this important point of 
procedure and essential procedural questions are determined in isolation despite their 
impact on practice and the uniformity in operation of the instrument.  
 
Finally, in the controversial decision of the Supreme Court in Minister for Justice, 
Equality & Law Reform v. Tobin,41 the Pupino interpretive obligation was invoked as to 
the interpretation of the word ―fled‖ in s. 10 of the Act of 2003, to decide whether an 
Irish businessman who was convicted and sentenced in his absence for a fatal road traffic 
accident in Hungary, had ―fled‖ that jurisdiction so as to warrant his surrender there.42 
The Supreme Court, per Fennelly J. in refusing his surrender, held that the term ―to flee‖ 
or ―fled‖ could not be expanded so as to include the respondent, who had paid bail and 
had left Hungary in the course of the prosecution with the knowledge of the authorities. 
The Pupino obligation, Fennelly J. held, would not allow for any other interpretation, in 
so far as ―fleeing‖ was more usually associated with escape, haste or evasion and not an 
instance such as this.43 The difficultly with this much is that the respondent did not 
ultimately have to serve a sentence imposed by a Hungarian Court, in light of the highly 
                                                 
37 Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. Rodnov (Supreme Court, Unreported, ex tempore, 1st 
June, 2006).  
38 Article 8 of the Framework Decision provides that certain essential information shall be contained in the 
warrant as set out in the Annex. The words omitted were that:  
―This warrant has been issued by a competent judicial authority. It requests that the person 
mentioned below be arrested and surrendered for the purpose of conducting a criminal prosecution 
or executing a custodial sentence of detention order.‖ 
39 P. 2 of the decision (Murray CJ, Hardiman & Macken JJ.).  
40 Pursuant to s. 20 of the Act of 2003. 
41 Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. Tobin [2008] IESC 3. 
42 S. 10 governs the obligation to surrender and provides that: 
―Where a judicial authority in an issuing state duly issues a European arrest warrant in respect of a 
person— (a) against whom that state intends to bring proceedings for the offence to which the European 
arrest warrant relates, or (b) on whom a sentence of imprisonment or detention has been imposed and who 
fled from the issuing state before he or she— (i) commenced serving that sentence, or (ii) completed 
serving that sentence, that person shall, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the 
Framework Decision be arrested and surrendered to the issuing state.‖ 
43 Interestingly, the Tampere European Council conclusions of 1999 and the recital to the Framework 
Decision were dismissed by Fennelly J. as inappropriate interpretive aids. 
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restrictive interpretation adopted of the word ―fled,‖ and the decision of the Court 
provoked much public outcry in Hungary. A decision of the Court of Justice as to the 
term ―fled‖ would have been fruitful in such a difficult case as to the breadth of the 
Pupino interpretive obligation, given the likelihood of this issue arising in other Member 
State Courts in the future. 
 
 
3. Time limits in surrender proceedings 
 
The time limits that surrender proceedings are subject to remains a key procedural and 
fundamental rights question in so far as surrender proceedings are designed to be 
efficacious and judicially policed. A range of difficulties in this regard have confronted 
the Irish courts. The second Dundon decision considered by the Supreme Court, Dundon 
v. Governor of Clover Hill,44  relating to the same applicant in the first Dundon decision 
is also of note, where the Court was asked subsequently to interpret Article 17 of the 
Framework Decision45. The Court was asked to decide in habeas corpus proceedings 
before the making of the final surrender decision46 whether the applicant had a right to 
immediate release upon expiry of the sixty day period specified in the Framework 
Decision and if not, whether such a situation was in breach of their fundamental rights. 
Dundon challenged the lawfulness of his detention, where the validity of his surrender 
had been upheld by the Supreme Court shortly before he instituted these proceedings.  No 
penalty is provided for a breach of the time limits in Article 17.  S. 16 of the Irish 
implementing legislation, however, provides for a curious and loose implementation of 
the obligations in Article 17.47 Denham J., in the Supreme Court,48 held that the 
                                                 
44 Dundon v. Governor of Clover Hill Prison [2005] IESC 83; [2006] 1 IR 518. 
45 Article 17 of the Framework Decision states that: 
―1. A European arrest warrant shall be dealt with and executed as a matter of urgency. 
2. In cases where the requested person consents to his surrender, the final decision on the 
execution of the European arrest warrant should be taken within a period of 10 days after the 
consent has been given. 
3. In other cases, the final decision on the execution of the European arrest warrant should be 
taken within a period of 60 days after the arrest of the requested person. 
4. Where in specific cases the European arrest warrant cannot be executed within the time limits 
laid down in paragraphs 2 or 3, the executing judicial authority shall immediately inform the 
issuing judicial authority thereof, giving the reasons for the delay. In such case, the time limits 
may be extended by a further 30 days….‖ 
46 Article 23 of the Framework Decision provides for inter alia  the surrender of an individual after the 
final decision on the execution of the warrant and mandates their release after particular time limits have 
passed. Denham J. held that the Article was inapplicable as the final decision on the applicant‘s appeal had 
not yet been made by the Supreme Court. 
47 Ss. 16(10) & (11) of the Act of 2003 provide that:  
―(10) If the High Court has not, after the expiration of 60 days from the arrest of the person 
concerned under section 13 or 14, made an order under this section or section 15 , or has decided 
not to make an order under this section, it shall direct the Central Authority in the State to inform 
the issuing judicial authority and … and the Central Authority in the State shall comply with such 
direction. 
(11) If the High Court has not, after the expiration of 90 days from the arrest of the person 
concerned under section 13 or 14, made an order under this section or section 15 , or has decided 
not to make an order under this section, it shall direct the Central Authority in the State to inform 
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extendable time limits in the Framework were, in her opinion, ―a strongly worded 
recommendation,‖ but the processes remained subject to the fact that there was no 
mandatory time limit of 60 days prior to the final order for surrender in the same way as 
after the final order. While Denham J. held that it was unfortunate that it had not been 
possible to process the request more expeditiously, she concluded that the applicant had 
exercised his right of access to the courts ―fully‖ through his extensive initiation of 
proceedings.  
 
Geoghegan J. held it was quite likely that a sixty day period would be exceeded without 
fault in any European Member State where tiers of appellate courts were involved in the 
arrest warrant process. If he was wrong in this regard, Geoghegan J. held that a purposive 
approach applied to the Act of 2003 and that time taken up by proceedings instigated by 
the applicant had to be discounted from the time limits. Similarly, Fennelly J. considered 
the Court bound by the interpretive obligation set out in Pupino so as to arrive at the 
conclusion reached by the Supreme Court.49 Despite the extreme importance of this 
procedural point, the variety of ways in which the Supreme Court judges address the 
point raise worrisome questions once again as to uniformity of interpretation of the 
instrument and its implications for fundamental rights. Whether the Supreme Court is 
interpreting the national legislation contra legem remains unclear in the absence of 
clarification.  
 
3. Access to the courts in surrender proceedings 
 
Access to the courts is a fundamental right of tremendous importance in surrender 
proceedings given the fact that individuals are being pursued in this expeditious system 
between States through a judicial process. This area alone is one where the Supreme 
Court has reacted favorably to the subject of surrender proceedings. In the recent decision 
of Ó Fallúin v. Governor of Cloverhill,50 the Supreme Court decided an important point 
relating to detention powers and the right of access to justice of an individual in surrender 
proceedings The applicant in Ó Fallúin had been charged with conspiracy to defraud the 
UK Passport office and his surrender had been ordered by the Irish High Court, subject to 
a committal to prison pending the carrying out of the order for fifteen days.51 The 
Supreme Court there was asked to interpret in habeas corpus proceedings s. 16(7) of the 
Act of 200352 and whether it entailed that a person whose surrender had been ordered 
                                                                                                                                                 
the issuing judicial authority … and the Central Authority in the State shall comply with such 
direction.‖  
48 Murray CJ, Denham, Fennelly, Hardiman & Geoghegan JJ.  
49 See the subsequent interpretation of this decision in a later judgment of the Supreme Court in Minister 
for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. S.R. [2007] IESC 54, that, per Finnegan J., held that the requirement 
in Article 17 is a matter related to ―internal discipline within the States and is not intended to confer 
individual rights‖.  
50 Ó Fallúin v. Governor of Cloverhill  [2007] IESC 20. 
51 S. 13 of the Act of 2003 provides that ―An order under this section shall not take effect until the 
expiration of 15 days beginning on the date of the making of the order‖. 
52 S. 16(7) of the Act of 2003 provides that:  
―… a person (to whom an order for the time being in force under this section applies) who is not 
surrendered to the issuing state in accordance with subsection (5), shall be released from custody 
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but who was not in fact surrendered could be detained in custody pending an appeal to 
the Supreme Court. While the Act thus clearly provided for the immediate release of an 
individual in detention in the ordinary course, the Act had failed to provide for the 
scenario of the surrender decision being contested in the ordinary way in the appellate 
process through the Irish Courts. Thus the outcome of the decision was likely to have a 
profound effect on the liberty of those subject to surrender proceedings. The applicant in 
this case notably had failed to make a habeas corpus application for his release within the 
fifteen day period from the making High Court surrender order. 
 
The Supreme Court per Fennelly J. concluded that the applicant had been in unlawful 
detention and that there was no necessary connection between the applicant‘s right to 
pursue his appeal and his right to liberty while it was pending.  Rather the appeal did not 
depend on his detention in custody. S. 16(7) of the Act of 2003 was silent in respect of 
the appellate process and thus the maxim ―expressio unius est exclusio alterius‖ 
applied.53 Fennelly J. then turned to the Article 23 of the text of the Framework Decision 
to Article 23, by virtue of the fact that the Irish law had to be read in light thereof.54 
Article 23 provided that: 
 
 ―upon expiry of the time limits referred to in paragraph 2 [which provides for the 
ten-day period] to 4, if the person is still being held in custody he shall be 
released‖. 
 
 Fennelly J. held that the true meaning and intent of Article 23 had not been properly 
argued in the instant proceedings and so the Court would have to await a decision of the 
Court of Justice. In fact, the implementation of Article 23 of the Framework Decision in 
Irish law has received some criticism from the Commission.55 What again is noticeable 
is the absence of any comment from the Supreme Court to the effect that they had no 
ability to access the Court of Justice as to this important practical question and its 
operation in the Member State courts. The outcome of the Ó Fallúin decision at least is 
favourable to the accused. However, the result was obtained through the habeas corpus 
proceedings, a constitutionally enshrined remedy, that must be dealt with expeditiously as 
a matter of right.56 Again, the importance of access to the courts in this area would 
surely entail that the Court of Justice would be in a position to decide this important 
procedural question.  
 
4. Analysis 
 
1. Reading down s. 37 and using Pupino to “bridge the gap” 
                                                                                                                                                 
immediately upon the expiration of the 10 days referred to in subsection (5), unless, upon such 
expiration, proceedings referred to in subsection (6) are pending.‖ (emphasis supplied). 
53 Meaning, approximately: ―To say one thing is to exclude another‖.  
54 Pursuant to the Pupino decision of the Court of Justice, which is not explicitly referred to in the decision 
of Fennelly J. but by implication is being referred to.  
55 Not strictly relating to the point raised in Ó Fallúin. See Commission Staff Working Document, fn.2, (p. 
31), referring to the lack of clarity in Ireland as to the implementation of Article 23.  
56 Irish law has now been amended to take into account the Supreme Court decision in Ó Fallúin: S. 16(7), 
as substituted by s. 76(f) of the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act, 2005. 
 13 
 
It is quite possible that s. 37 of the (Irish) European Warrant Act 2003, on any 
construction of the national legislation, does in fact constitute a mis-implementation of 
the Framework Decision. S. 37 permits some form of supremacy conflict to arise. A large 
number of applications for surrender could potentially be refused clearly on the basis 
thereof. However, the precise extent of the obligation intended for in Recital 12 of the 
Framework Decision remains unclear in the absence of clarification from the Court of 
Justice and Recital 12 did not form part of its substantive analysis in the recent decision 
of the Court of Justice in Advocaten voor de Wereld. However, it seems clear that s. 37 
has been ―read down‖ considerably by the Irish Supreme Court, an interpretive exercise 
that has rendered its utility almost meaningless. Thus the role of the Supreme Court as a 
guardian of fundamental rights in Third Pillar proceedings now seems redundant, 
compounded by its lack of access to the Court of Justice. 
 
Equally, the Pupino decision appears to now form a key part of most recent decisions of 
the Supreme Court in surrender proceedings in order to ―bridge the gap‖ between 
national implementing legislation of the arrest warrant and the absence of an ability to 
refer questions of law to the Court of Justice. No conflict, however, is evident in any of 
the Irish Supreme Court jurisprudence as to whether the use of the Pupino ―conforming‖ 
or consistent interpretation would in fact be contra legem, i.e. that the asserted 
interpretation of the Act of 2003 in light of the Framework Decision would go beyond the 
actual scope or provisions of the Framework Decision wrongfully, contra legem. By 
contrast, in a recent judgment of the House of Lords as to the European arrest warrant in 
Dabas v. High Court of Justice, Madrid, a notable conflict emerged as to the proper use 
of the Pupino decision and the limits of the interpretative obligation.57 There, a split 
Lords divided on the application of Pupino ―conforming‖ or consistent interpretation, to 
the (UK) Extradition Act, 2003. Dabas raised a net point of law, as to whether the actual 
arrest warrant document had to be produced in the absence of a certificate, in light of the 
wording of s. 64 of the Act of 2003 which reads as follows:  
 
The conduct constitutes an extradition offence in relation to the category 1 
territory if these conditions are satisfied– ....(b) a certificate issued by an 
appropriate authority of the category 1 territory shows that the conduct falls 
within the European framework list...‖ 
 
The appellant in Dabas had been sought by the Spanish High Court in respect of the 
Madrid Train bombings in 2004. The arrest warrant in that case, which otherwise 
complied with the form which the Framework Decision provided, was not accompanied 
by the certificate specified in s. 64, as above. The Framework Decision made no specific 
reference to such a certificate. 58  The appellant contended thus that the warrant did not 
comply with the Act of 2003 because of the fact that it had not been accompanied by a 
certificate of the kind referred to in s. 64. The Law Lords by a majority, employing the 
                                                 
57 Dabas v. High Court of Justice, Madrid  [2007] UKHL 6; [2007] 2 AC 31; [2007] 2 CMLR 39. See 
further Mackarel ―‗Surrendering‘ the fugitive - the European arrest warrant and the United Kingdom‖ 
(2007) 71(4) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 362. 
58 Lords Bingham, Hope, Brown and Mance; Lord Scott dissenting.  
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Pupino duty of construction, sought to construe the Act of 2003 in light of the 
Framework Decision and held that the evidential condition contended for by the appellant 
would if adopted have been unhelpful and inefficient and would be in breach of the spirit 
of co-operation that the instrument was founded on. Lord Scott, dissenting as to the 
application of Pupino only and not the result, expressed the view that it was not possible 
to interpret s. 64, a clear statutory provision, in light of the Framework Decision without 
construing the Act of 2003 contra legem, given the precise wording of s. 64 of the UK 
legislation.59 A split such as that occurring between the majority and minority in Dabas 
is a sign of the healthy operation of judicial protection in Third Pillar matters, particularly 
where no court in the UK (similar to Ireland) can refer such proceedings to the Court of 
Justice. A rigorous and critical application of the Pupino decision is of much importance 
in deciding whether a particular interpretation of implementing legislation is contra 
legem the Framework Decision. It is evident that the Irish Supreme Court has uncritically 
applied the Pupino decision. That such a divergence as to the application of Pupino has 
yet to arise in Ireland is thus most regrettable indeed.  
 
2. Accepting the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice: The solution? 
 
The political decision of the Irish State not to accept the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice pursuant to Article 35 EU in this area, for reasons outwardly to do with 
sovereignty and control over the national legal system in criminal justice, is now proving 
to have major legal consequences. This decision has been criticised extra-judicially by 
Fennelly J. of the Irish Supreme Court, who has stated that: 
 
―[i]t is apparent that the decision to decline jurisdiction to the Court of Justice is 
rooted in objection to the enlargement of the powers of the Court. It is difficult to 
see how the policy serves the presumed purpose…The most fundamental aspects 
of criminal procedure such as the burden and method of proof, the right to bail, 
trial by jury may be at stake…The absence of capacity to consult the Court of 
Justice may have the consequence that the Court of Justice is less likely to 
become aware of ... specific concerns‖.60 
 
Ireland as a State has increasingly adopted an antagonistic stance at European level in 
recent times.61 How this new political relationship will impact on its domestic legal 
                                                 
59 He stated that [2007] 2 AC 31, 57 (para. 66):  
―In my opinion the normal construction of section 64, in the context of the Act as a whole, would 
require the answer that it does. The section certainly reads as though a separate and express 
certification signed by a judicial authority and additional to the arrest warrant itself is required. 
And there is good reason to suppose that the normal construction reflects Parliament‘s 
intention….Article 34(2)(b) [TEU] requires no more than that the result of the member states 
implementation be consistent with and give proper effect to the Framework Decision in 
questions….‖  
60 Fennelly J. of course being a former Advocate General at the Court of Justice from 1995-2000: see 
―Preliminary Reference Procedure: A Factual and Legal Review‖ (2006) 13 Irish Journal of European law 
55, 80.   
61 Witness for example, the furore at national level as to the decision of the Government on whether to opt 
out of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, ultimately not taken on account of the reaction of Trade Unions 
in Ireland: See The Irish Times 5th October, 2007. See also Ireland‘s latest challenge to the validity of 
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system in the realm of European matters remains to be seen, given the traditionally quite 
pro-communautaire stance adopted by the Irish judiciary, a stance that may be viewed 
through a different prism in the realm of arrest warrant law and practice.62 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Irish Supreme Court has arguably failed to ―bridge the gap‖ between the domestic 
constitutional protection it is supposed to be affording to those subject to surrender 
pursuant to s. 37 and the Pupino interpretive obligation, shadowed by its inability to 
access the Court of Justice in construing an instrument that lacks direct effect. The force 
and utility of s. 37 appears to have been cast aside by the Irish Supreme Court in favour 
of full mutual recognition. Whether such a response is satisfactory in light of its inability 
to consult the Court of Justice as to the correct interpretation of the instrument, on so 
many practical points affecting liberty and fundamental rights and freedoms, appears to 
become more self-evidently not the case. The Pupino solution does not appear to be an 
adequate response to the Irish judicial dilemma. While the judicial protection that can be 
offered in the realm of the Third Pillar is questionable where the Court of Justice has such 
a truncated jurisdiction, the challenge remains for national courts, in Member States such 
as Ireland as Third Pillar guardians of fundamental rights, to truly ―bridge the gap‖ 
effectively.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of data on the grounds of legal base, by virtue of the fact that Ireland 
was outvoted at Council level: see Case C-301/06 Ireland v. Council, OJ 2005 C 237 p. 5.  See also the 
outcome of the Reform Treaty, where Ireland has availed of the special arrangement available to it in the 
area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).  In respect of future measures in the areas of judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters and police cooperation, Ireland will have the option on a case-by-case basis of 
participating or not doing so.  The Government has made a declaration which will be attached to the 
Reform Treaty underlining an intention to join with other Member States wherever possible. See 
Declaration by Ireland on Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in 
respect of the area of freedom, security and justice. (CIG 3/1/07 REV 1) (Corrigendum 1): see 
http://europa.eu/reform_treaty/index_en.htm.  
62 Three sitting members of the Irish Supreme Court are former members of the Court of Justice, an 
extraordinary statistic in comparative terms. See Fahey Practice and Procedure in Preliminary References 
to Europe: 30 years of Article 234 EC caselaw from the Irish Courts (Dublin, Firstlaw, 2007) pp. 106-108.  
